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ABUSED CHILDREN WHO KILL ABUSIVE
PARENTS: MOVING TOWARD AN
APPROPRIATE LEGAL RESPONSE
Child abuse is an inordinately complex problem in the United States, with
over one million children suffering from abuse or neglect annually.' Existing
societal attitudes and inadequate responses from the social service and crimi-
nal justice systems contribute to the continued high incidence of abuse, and
to parents taking the lives of over one thousand children each year.2 For
those children able to survive the abuse, research reveals that they are likely
to suffer serious physical injuries, emotional trauma, or become future vic-
tims of abuse or perpetrators of violence against others.3 Sometimes, the
years of abuse eventually culminate in children taking the lives of abusive
parents.
Parricide4 accounts for several hundred deaths each year.5 It is estimated
that ninety percent of all parricides involve children who are victims of con-
stant and severe abuse.6 Studies indicate that abused children who kill their
1. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE 2 (1990). See infra notes 33-
35 and accompanying text. Throughout this Comment, the term "children" refers to infants,
adolescents, and teenagers. See Frederick E. John, Child Abuse-The Battered Child Syn-
drome, in 2 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of Facts § 10 (1974).
2. See infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text; see also Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child
Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.
L. REV. 293, 329 n. 127 (1972) (describing the unfortunate and disturbing death of an abused
child, Roxanne Felumero, and a resulting judicial investigation of the case concluding that had
the court and the public and private agencies involved functioned properly, Roxanne's death
could have been avoided).
3. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
4. Throughout this Comment, the word "parricide" refers to "[fthe murder of one's par-
ent." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 914 (3d ed. 1969).
5. In 1990, parricide accounted for an estimated 280 deaths in the United States; patri-
cide accounting for approximately 160 deaths, and matricide accounting for approximately
120 deaths. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 9, 13 (1990) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS] (indicating that patri-
cide represented 0.8 percent and matricide represented 0.6 percent of the 20,045 homicides for
which data was available in 1990); cf. PAUL A. MONES, WHEN A CHILD KILLS: ABUSED
CHILDREN WHO KILL THEIR PARENTS 24-25 (1991) (noting that the annual figures, usually
around three hundred, are thought to be underinclusive due to the large number of homicides
that remain unsolved and unaccounted for each year). See generally infra note 69 (providing
information regarding the identity of perpetrators and victims involved, and the frequency
with which different forms of parricide occur).
6. See Nancy Blodgett, Self-Defense: Parricide Defendants Cite Sexual Abuse as Justifi-
cation, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 36 (quoting Paul A. Mones, an attorney who specializes in
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parents share many common traits and characteristics. Most of the children
are compliant individuals of above-average intelligence, who have no prior
criminal records and pose no threat to society at large.7 Yet the children
usually suffer years of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse at the hands of
parents, witness the abuse of other family members, know that others are
aware of the abuse but cannot or will not help, and fear for their lives and
safety.' The circumstances under which the killings occur are often similar
as well. Typically, parricide cases involve children who are denied or pro-
vided minimal assistance and, seeing no alternative, resort to self-help by
killing the abusive parents using brutal methods in non-confrontational
situations.'
When examining the immediate circumstances surrounding parricidal
killings, the acts may appear to be first-degree murder.' o When the cases are
examined in light of the underlying social, legal, and psychological causes,
however, classifying the offenses and determining appropriate responses
become debatable." While the connection between child abuse and abused
children who kill their parents is difficult to refute,' 2 parricide cases continue
to present society with a controversial moral and legal dilemma as, most
representing child abuse-parricide defendants); see also Shelley Post, Adolescent Parricide in
Abusive Families, 61 CHILD WELFARE 445, 445 (1982) (revealing "that parricide is often the
product of the perpetrator's chaotic emotions that result, in turn, from a pattern of child abuse
in the family"). But see MONES, supra note 5, at 15 (stating that some may not agree with
such a high estimate).
7. See, e.g., People v. Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 336-37 (App. Div. 1985), aff'd,
People v. Dawn Maria C., 490 N.E.2d 530 (N.Y. 1986); see also infra text accompanying notes
75-79.
8. See, e.g., Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1011 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting); see
also infra text accompanying notes 80-82, 88.
9. See, e.g., Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 1365-66 (Ind. 1988), habeas corpus de-
nied, Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 218 (1992); see
also infra text accompanying notes 81, 89-90.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92. Most American jurisdictions divide the
crime of murder into degrees (usually two and sometimes three), providing the most severe
penalties for first-degree murder, with less severe penalties for other forms of the offense.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.7 (2d ed. 1986). In those
jurisdictions dividing murder into degrees, one category of first-degree murder is usually de-
fined as a premeditated, deliberate, and intentional killing. Id. § 7.7(a).
11. Compare State v. Reid, 747 P.2d 560, 564 (Ariz. 1987) (convicting defendant of first-
degree murder after analyzing the immediate circumstances surrounding the death) with State
v. Stanberry, No. 90-1022, slip op. at 6 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 1991) (finding the defendant
guilty of manslaughter rather than murder due to the context in which the killing occurred)
and case of Donna Marie Wisener, discussed infra text accompanying notes 188-93 (acquitting
the defendant based on prior abuse).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 27-99.
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often, both the crime of child abuse and the crime of homicide are
involved. 13
There is a debate in the legal community as to the appropriate legal re-
sponse to abuse victims who take the lives of their abusers.14 Based on simi-
larities in underlying causes, characteristics, and circumstances, 15 many
courts and scholars discussing the issue of parricide draw analogies to cases
of battered women who kill.16 After taking the lives of their abusers, many
women and children defendants now choose to claim self-defense and seek
13. See MONES, supra note 5, at 16 (contending that parricide presents society with a
compelling dilemma "with guilt and innocence never clearly defined").
14. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13; see also Susannah M. Bennett, Comment,
Ending the Continuous Reign of Terror: Sleeping Husbands, Battered Wives, and the Right of
Self-Defense, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 959, 960 (1989) (attributing much legal debate to
cases in which battered women kill abusive spouses). See generally materials cited infra notes
15, 16.
15. For a variety of commentary on battered women, see Michael A. Buda & Teresa L.
Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAM. L.
359 (1985); Steven D. Rittenmeyer, Of Battered Wives, Self-Defense and Double Standards of
Justice, 9 J. CRIM. JusT. 389 (1981); Cathryn J. Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting
a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11 (1986);
Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves
in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 149 (1978); Jeanne-Marie
Bates, Comment, Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Maryland, 50 MD. L.
REV. 920 (1991); Bennett, supra note 14; Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr., Comment, The Defense of
Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 427 (1987); Donald L. Creach, Note, Partially
Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REV.
615 (1982); Loraine P. Eber, Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1981); Sarah C. Madison, Comment, A Critique and Proposed Solution to
the Adverse Examination Problem Raised by Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in State v.
Hennum, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1023 (1990); Mira Mihajlovich, Comment, Does Plight Make
Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62
IND. L.J. 1253 (1987); Marilyn H. Mitchell, Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 1705 (1978); Kerry A. Shad, Note, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavaila-
ble to Battered Women Who Kill Passive Abusers, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (1990); Laurie J.
Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and
Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679 (1986).
16. For examples of courts making such analogies, see State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238,
1242-43 (Wash. Ct. App.), review granted, 832 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1992); Jahnke v. State, 682
P.2d 991, 996 (Wyo. 1984). For materials written by commentators making such analogies,
see Paul Mones, The Relationship Between Child Abuse and Parricide: An Overview, in UN-
HAPPY FAMILIES: CLINICAL AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 37 (Eli H.
Newberger & Richard Bourne eds., 1985) (urging that the legal strategy for child abuse-parri-
cide defendants is similar to that used for battered women who kill); JoElle A. Moreno, Com-
ment, Killing Daddy: Developing a Self-Defense Strategy for the Abused Child, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1281, 1285-90 (1989) (discussing the similarities between battered women and battered
children who kill and claim self-defense); Mavis J. Van Sambeek, Parricide as Self-Defense, 7
LAW & INEQ. J. 87, 91-100 (1986) (exploring the foundation for self-defense claims in parri-
cide cases based on theories used in cases of battered women who kill).
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acquittal. 17 These claims have become common in non-confrontational situ-
ations that do not fall within the traditional self-defense model, such as when
the victim is sleeping or passive at the time of the killing.'" Because of the
difficulties encountered in meeting the strict requirements of the self-defense
doctrine, battered women and, more recently, battered children seek to
introduce expert testimony to support their claims.19 While self-defense
claims remain controversial, abused women and children assert that their
17. See infra text accompanying notes 112, 117-18; see also Cipparone, supra note 15, at
432 (asserting that an increasing number of battered women who kill their abusers claim self-
defense); Moreno, supra note 16, at 1285 (observing that parricide defendants are now claim-
ing self-defense as well).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14. The focus of this Comment is on claims
arising in non-confrontational situations, as most parricides fall within this category.
19. A full discussion of the intricacies in the debate regarding the use of expert testimony
in cases in which an abuse victim has killed an abuser are beyond the scope of this Comment,
although explanations, references, and generalizations about the use of such testimony are
made throughout this Comment. See infra notes 115-16, 134.
Regarding battered women and expert testimony, the "battered woman syndrome" is a the-
ory derived from the clinical studies of Dr. Lenore Walker, and describes behavioral patterns
and characteristics common to women who suffer continuous physical and psychological abuse
at the hands of a spouse. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95
(1984). Based on her studies, Dr. Walker explains the battering cycle to consist of three recur-
ring phases of violence. The first phase is the "tension building" phase in which incidents of
minor abuse occur, including both physical and verbal abuse. During this phase, the woman is
complacent in order to prevent the escalation of violence. Id. The second phase is an "acute
battering" phase wherein the spouse explosively and uncontrollably inflicts severe physical
injury through outbursts or releases of tension built up during the first phase. Id. at 96. The
harm, as in the first phase, usually results in severe psychological trauma where the woman
feels less physical pain but a heightened sense of inability to leave the relationship. The acute
battering phase is considered the most enduring and painful phase. Id. The final phase is a
period of "loving contrition." Id. at 95. This period is usually marked by extreme kindness,
pleas for forgiveness, and devotion: both individuals become hopeful or convinced that the
cycle will not repeat itself. Id, at 96. After a period of no incidence, the cycle begins again and
the woman falls into a state of "learned helplessness" where her motivation to leave is dimin-
ished. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 43-54 (1979). Dr. Walker defines a
battered woman as one who remains in a relationship after the cycle has occurred at least two
times. Id. at xv.
The battered woman profile is used in conjunction with self-defense claims. In court, an
expert may describe the syndrome, show that the defendant suffers from the syndrome, and
then offer evidence on how the abuse affected the woman's perceptions and actions at the time
of the killing. Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 94-95. This profile and testimony is analogous
to that of battered children. See infra notes 134-35 (discussing expert tesitmony as used in this
context).
For cases in which battered women claim self-defense and offer evidence of the battered
woman syndrome, see Strong v. State, 307 S.E.2d 912, 913 (Ga. 1983) (allowing expert testi-
mony on the battered woman syndrome but affirming a verdict of felony murder); Fultz v.
State, 439 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming the exclusion of battered woman syn-
drome testimony finding that the victim had not been shown to be sufficiently aggressive). For
cases in which battered children claim self-defense and offer testimony on the effects of abuse,
see State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App.), review granted, 832 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1992)
(reversing and remanding the lower court's exclusion of expert testimony); Jahnke v. State, 682
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acts are justified as they have been failed by society and are faced with a
decision to kill or be killed.2'
Opposing scholars argue that courts should not allow battered victims to
claim self-defense or use expert testimony to prove its elements if a killing
occurs in non-confrontational circumstances.21 Rather, they contend that
the strict requirements of the self-defense doctrine are intended to bar such
claims in order to protect the sanctity of human life and to limit the resort to
self-help.22 Many such commentators alternatively suggest that the killings
be categorized as voluntary manslaughter, casting the abuse as an extenuat-
ing factor by which to reduce a charge of murder.23
Neither of these arguments has been universally accepted. As a result,
courts vary in their approaches to cases involving battered women and chil-
dren who kill their abusers, and widely disparate outcomes result. As the
legal debate continues, the vast majority of child abuse-parricide defendants
are found guilty of or plead guilty to some form of murder or manslaughter,
while a minority are granted acquittal. 24 Based on the classification of the
offense, courts must then determine what punishment to impose. The sever-
ity of sentences in child abuse-parricide cases typically ranges from life in
prison to no punishment at all, with the average sentence being fifteen to
twenty years incarceration. 25 The wide disparities in application of legal
P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984) (excluding testimony); case of Donna Marie Wisener discussed infra
notes 188-91 and accompanying text (allowing testimony).
20. See infra notes 115-18, 132-35 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 119, 121-22 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 123-24, 130-31 and accompanying text.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 198-99. The precise statistics regarding parricide
cases and resulting legal treatment are difficult to ascertain for a variety of reasons: cases exist
where neither arrests are made nor charges brought; cases are not reported unless they rise to
the appellate level; and a majority of the cases are resolved through the plea bargaining pro-
cess. Because cases remain unknown or difficult to discover, it is often necessary to rely on
book and newspaper accounts.
25. MONES, supra note 5, at 315. This Comment assumes the existence of a rational
sentencing framework. However, due to existing guidelines and based on the charge for which
the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted, courts may be constrained by indeterminate or
determinate sentencing regimes. See generally ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENC-
ING (2d ed. 1991) (providing a comprehensive guide to the law of sentencing). Indeterminate
sentencing systems place wide discretion in the courts in determining prison terms within min-
imum and maximum sentence ranges based on the commission of particular offenses. See id.
§§ 4:1-4:3 (discussing indeterminate sentencing). Comparatively, determinate sentencing sys-
tems limit judicial discretion in determining sentences by establishing sentences within a lim-
ited sentencing range. See id. §§ 4:4-4:9 (discussing determinate sentencing). Based on the
constraints imposed by such sentencing regimes, several state sentencing guidelines and laws
require revision in order for judges and juries to be able to fashion appropriate sentences for
the unique individuals and circumstances involved in parricide cases. See generally infra note
26 (explaining that the roles played by prosecutors and defense counsel in parricide cases may
1992]
Catholic University Law Review
theory and imposition of sentences illustrate the flaws in current approaches,
and underscore the need for a more appropriate legal response to abused
children who kill abusive parents.26
This Comment argues that analyses of parricide cases must encompass
evaluations of the entire context in which the crimes occur, in conjunction
with societal goals and criminal justice theories, in order to develop not only
a valid, workable legal theory but also well-reasoned sentences. First, this
Comment studies the connection between child abuse and parricide in a so-
cial, legal, and psychological context. It next surveys arguments of legal
theory, as presented by advocates for battered women who kill and opposing
scholars, and assesses these arguments based on several specific child abuse-
parricide cases. This Comment then defines prominent societal and criminal
justice considerations as they relate to abused children who kill, and exam-
ines cases that move toward a more appropriate legal response by remaining
cognizant of these considerations in classifying offenses and imposing corre-
sponding sentences. In conclusion, this Comment argues that classifying
parricidal killings as voluntary manslaughter acknowledges the criminal na-
ture of both child abuse and homicide, striking an appropriate balance
among societal goals and theories of criminal justice. It then emphasizes
that upon a finding of guilt, whether by trial or plea, courts must fashion
appropriate sentences that adequately and effectively balance the competing
interests of the child abuse-parricide defendant, society, and the criminal
justice system.
also be determinative of the availability of an appropriate legal response to child abuse-parri-
cide defendants).
26. This Comment focuses on an appropriate theoretical framework for determining the
legal response to parricide cases. Other factors, not explicitly discussed in the text, are also
crucial to the appropriate handling of parricide cases, yet are beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. While this Comment outlines mitigating circumstances to be considered when classify-
ing offenses and imposing sentences, it necessarily follows that the "framework approach"
must be utilized not only by judges and juries, but also by defense counsel and prosecutors.
See Mones, supra note 16, at 37 (suggesting that counsel develop "a defense strategy based
upon the long-term affects of child abuse on the defendant's consciousness"); see also Carolyn
Colwell, Defending Kids Who Kill Their Parents, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 26, 1991, at 103 (in-
terviewing Paul A. Mones).
As soon as a person under [the] age of 18 is found to have killed his parent there
should be a duty on the part of the district attorney's office to conduct a parallel child
abuse investigation by the child abuse or sex crimes unit and not by the homicide
unit. And the prosecutor, upon reviewing the investigations, should then put down
in writing why he is making the decision to prosecute or why he is declining. We
need a different standard for determining the prosecution of parricide cases.
Id. See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 25, §§ 14:1-15:23 (outlining the sentencing roles of
defense counsel and prosecutors).
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I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CHILD ABUSE AND PARRICIDE:
SOCIAL, LEGAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS
Child abuse" presents society with a difficult and perplexing challenge.
In theory, society suggests that child abuse is unacceptable.2" When con-
fronted with abuse, however, society often responds with skepticism, disbe-
lief, and inaction.29 Subsequently, when children suffer a history of abuse at
the hands of parents, fail to attract necessary care and assistance, and take
the lives of abusive parents, society again reacts with shock and denial.3" As
evidence demonstrates that the devastating physical and psychological im-
pact of child abuse may lead children to take the lives of abusive parents,31 it
is essential to understand the dynamics of child abuse in order to deal effec-
tively with the tragedy of parricide.32
A. Child Abuse
Identifying a precise figure that depicts the actual incidence of child abuse
is impracticable due to the substantial amount of underreporting and overre-
porting that occurs.33 Despite a variance in statistics, research suggests that
child abuse is a common phenomenon that is escalating to epidemic propor-
27. "Child abuse" has been defined as "physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, negligent
treatment, or maltreatment of a child under the age of eighteen by a person who is responsible
for the child's welfare under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is
harmed or threatened thereby." RICHARD J. GELLES & CLAIRE P. CORNELL, INTIMATE VIO-
LENCE IN FAMILIES 20 (1985) (quoting the definition adopted by The National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect, an agency of the federal government); see also MURRAY A. STRAUS
ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 7 (1980) (describing
child abuse as "acts committed by parents on their children which other members of the soci-
ety view as inappropriate and harmful").
The phrase "child abuse" describes a form of domestic violence. Other forms may include
abuse of a spouse, parent, sibling, elder, or other family member. This Comment focuses only
on child abuse. However, the conclusions of this Comment pertain, to some degree, to the
plight of all victims of domestic violence, even though not specifically discussed.
28. See infra notes 42-46, 53-55 and accompanying text.
29. See VINCENT J. FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING: MALTREATMENT-
CAUSES AND PREVENTION at xiii, 225 (3d ed. 1983) (noting society's "ignorance and indiffer-
ence" to maltreated children, and how societal inaction will negatively affect the future of
society).
30. See MONES, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that shock and denial are the basis of these
cases, not only within the family and society, but also in the courtroom).
31. See id. at 16; see also id. at 322 (recognizing that when a child kills an abusive parent
there is "more than one finger on the trigger").
32. See id. at 311-22.
33. See Douglas J. Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Fu-
ture Directions, 17 FAM. L.Q. 151, 161-63 (1983) (discussing underreporting and overreport-
ing); see also John, supra note I, § 2 (stating that to determine the actual incidence of abuse is
"literally impossible").
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tions.a4 Recent estimates reveal that over one million children are abused or
neglected in the United States on an annual basis.a
While these and other estimates vary, the deaths of over one thousand
children each year are attributed to abuse and neglect.36 Of those fatalities,
thirty-five to fifty percent take place after the abuse or neglect has been made
known to social service and criminal justice authorities. 37 To explain the
occurrence of these deaths and the continued high incidence of child abuse,
it is necessary to examine the historical development of attitudes and
responses.
1. Historical Overlay: Attitude and Response
The historical reluctance to recognize problems of child abuse and infanti-
cide has been traced to biblical times.3 ' Physical abuse of children was justi-
fied not only by religion, but by notions of the best interest of the child.3 9
Assuming that parents would love and protect their children and the best
interests of the child would prevail, parents were granted the unfettered right
to discipline their children.4' Because traditional beliefs also held family
34. CHARLES P. EWING, KIDS WHO KILL 159-60 (1990) (revealing that many claim
child abuse is reaching epidemic proportions and that data indicate an increase in both fre-
quency and severity).
35. See supra text accompanying note 1. One popular survey, conducted for the federal
government in 1986, suggests that approximately 358,500 children are physically abused, an-
other 155,900 are sexually abused, and 211,100 are emotionally abused, while 794,700 are
physically or emotionally neglected each year in the United States. NAT'L CTR. ON CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., STUDY OF NAT'L INCI-
DENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: 1988, at 6-7 (1988); cf. John,
supra note 1, § 2 (citing estimates of incidents of child abuse and knowledge of such abuse that
vary from ten thousand to four million per year).
36. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, COMBATING CHILD ABUSE: GUIDELINES FOR COOPERA-
TION BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CHILD PROTECTIVE AGENCIES 2 (1990). Actual
figures, however, are thought to be far higher due to the large number of deaths that are
incorrectly reported or categorized as accidental. See Mones, supra note 16, at 32 (noting a
source that estimates the number at two thousand); STRAUS ET AL., supra note 27, at 15
(relating that estimates of filicide vary from a child being killed each day to five thousand
children being killed each year); cf. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 5, at 9, 13 (citing
FBI statistics of 541 filicides in 1990).
37. BESHAROV, supra note 36, at 2; cf. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 27, at 229 (asserting
that ninety percent of the cases in which a family member kills a child may first be reported to
agencies).
38. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 27, at 7-8 (describing the traditional history, justification,
and acceptance of violence toward children); see also FONTANA, supra note 29, at 4 (explain-
ing biblical "theme[s] of child murder and abuse").
39. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 27, at 8.
40. See generally id. at 7-8, 51-52 (discussing the history of parental rights); Charlotte M.
Cooksey, Comment, The Battered Child-Louisiana's Response to the Cry, 17 Loy. L. REV.
372, 381-82 (1971) (asserting that "reliance is placed on parental love as a guide in caring for
and protecting" children).
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relationships to be private matters, society had difficulty justifying interfer-
ence with parental rights, and intervention into family life was virtually non-
existent. 4 1
During the 1960s,42 traditional beliefs about child-rearing were challenged
and the existing problems of child abuse began to receive study and recogni-
tion.43 In conjunction with the adoption of mandatory child abuse reporting
laws,44 states began to expand social service networks in order to aid parents
in caring for their children.4  While child abuse is presently a statutory of-
fense for which criminal penalties are provided in each of the fifty states,4
the trend has been to not impose sanctions unless severe or extenuating cir-
cumstances exist.47
The approach used by social service agencies was and continues to be
therapeutic and social-work oriented, encouraging parents to cooperate and
41. See GELLES & CORNELL, supra note 27, at 12 (discussing the idealization of family
life); Thomas, supra note 2, at 338-39 (noting the historical reluctance to get involved in such
matters).
42. In 1962, C. Henry Kempe and his colleagues published a seminal article entitled "The
Battered-Child Syndrome." This effort, enabling physicians to better recognize child abuse,
described the syndrome as "a clinical condition in young children who have received serious
physical abuse," generally from a parent or foster parent. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Bat-
tered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17, 17 (1962). This definition is presently narrow in that it
restricts abuse to that which is physical. GELLES & CORNELL, supra note 27, at 20. For a
current definition, see supra note 27. For information on the use of expert testimony on the
effects of abuse in developing or supporting a defense in parricide cases, see supra note 19 and
infra notes 134-35.
43. See STRAUS ET AL., supra note 27, at 9; see also MONES, supra note 5, at 29-31. For
specific case studies, see Lester Adelson, Slaughter of the Innocents: A Study of Forty-Six
Homicides in Which the Victims Were Children, 264 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1345, 1345-49
(1961). Various studies reveal such injuries as bruises, welts, black eyes, broken bones, split
lips, lost teeth, head injuries, and ruptured organs. John, supra note 1, § 3, at 384 n.32. The
methods used to inflict these injuries included: beating children with fists, cords, brushes,
wooden spoons, ropes, sticks, baseball bats, shoes, pool cues, and broom handles; burning
children with cigarettes, irons, pokers, and liquids; and suffocating, drowning, stabbing, and
shooting children. Id. § 3, at 385 n.33. While research efforts initially concentrated on physi-
cal abuse, awareness and recognition soon extended to psychological and sexual abuse as well.
See generally IRVING J. SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE: GOVERNING LAW & LEGISLATION 7-9 (1983)
(discussing emotional maltreatment); ANN W. BURGESS ET AL., SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHIL-
DREN AND ADOLESCENTS 1-240 (1978) (providing an in-depth study of child sexual abuse).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 53-58.
45. BESHAROV, supra note 36, at 2-3.
46. Barbara Daly, Willful Child Abuse and State Reporting Statutes, 23 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 283, 297 (1969); see also Barbara R. Grumet, The Plaintive Plaintiffs: Victims of the
Battered Child Syndrome, 3 FAM. L.Q. 296, 307 (1970) (noting that all states have criminal
statutes by which abusive parents may be prosecuted, including murder, aggravated assault,
and cruelty to children laws).
47. Daly, supra note 46, at 297.
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obtain treatment in order to preserve the integrity of the family unit.4"
Child protective agencies frequently respond to suspected abuse without in-
volving or informing law enforcement officials.4 9 Even when police are in-
formed, they are often reluctant to intervene. 50 Prosecutors frequently
hesitate to bring charges, and when charges are brought, convictions are dif-
ficult to obtain. 1
The aforementioned circumstances have been recognized as deficiencies in
society's response to child abuse. Aware of these shortcomings, the social
service and criminal justice systems are developing more coordinated and
effective approaches to protect children.52 In addition, legislative mecha-
nisms have been implemented and amended in order to aid in combatting
problems of child abuse.
2. Legislative Initiatives
By the mid-1960s, several different organizations had drafted child abuse
reporting laws to serve as models for various states.5 3 Following this lead,
each state enacted legislation requiring designated professionals to report
cases of suspected child abuse or neglect.54 Since the enactment of these
mandatory reporting laws, most states have amended their statutes to ex-
pand definitions of abuse, and to increase the number of persons who must
report abuse and the kind of information that must be reported. 55
Mandatory reporting statutes were not envisioned as a complete solution.
Rather, the laws represent an attempt "to bring child abuse out from behind
closed doors."' 56 The existing legislation has not been wholly effective and
48. See id.; see also DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER: LIA-
BILITY FOR SERVING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 76 (1985) (explaining society's reaction as a
"social work" response).
49. See Daly, supra note 46, at 297.
50. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 27, at 232-33 (specifying reasons for lack of intervention,
such as the danger involved, lack of cooperation, and absence of rewards).
51. Id. at 233-34. These complications demonstrate the beliefs that "the best interests of
the child" are served by maintaining a non-interventionalist attitude, ensuring that the child
stays with the parents, or providing the parents with treatment are still widely held and fol-
lowed. See Daly, supra note 46, at 297-98 (arguing that handling cases in this fashion provides
a defense for abusive parents to continue to abuse the children and, hence, it becomes more
difficult to deal with abusive parents in future cases).
52. See BESHAROV, supra note 36, at 1 (noting the development of coordinated efforts).
53. SLOAN, supra note 43, at 15.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 17-27. See generally John, supra note 1, §§ 14-26 (discussing common ele-
ments of reporting laws). For a recent listing and discussion of mandatory child abuse report-
ing laws, see Raymond C. O'Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending Gauntlet to Free
Exercise: Mandating That Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1, 18-20 n.106
(1991).
56. GELLES & CORNELL, supra note 27, at 129.
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has been criticized for various reasons." As changes to increase the effec-
tiveness of these laws are implemented, the primary purpose of the legisla-
tion remains to protect children.5" Nonetheless, due to the combined
shortfalls in legislative, societal, social service, and criminal justice re-
sponses, successes have been diminished and inadequacies persist.
3. Consequences of Abuse
As a result of prevailing attitudes and inadequate responses, child abuse
continues to play a role in the lives of millions of children. Most children
subjected to abuse have not developed or matured to the point that they may
fully appreciate the abusers' conduct or the implications of the abuse.
59
Many of the children are unclear as to whether the conduct is wrong, ambiv-
alent about their feelings toward the abusers, and confused about their own
guilt or innocence.'
Regardless of how, when, why, or by whom children are abused, the abuse
affects them in some fashion. If victims take no action, they may be killed,6
suffer physical injuries, emotional trauma,62 or become future victims of
abuse or perpetrators of violence against others.63 If victims desire and at-
tempt to seek help, they may be unsuccessful." Children unable to endure
57. One such criticism is that federal and state statutes remain broad and ambiguous, with
no specific guidelines to assist potential reporters. See Daly, supra note 46, at 318-19. An-
other difficulty arises when cases are reported, but there is not sufficient evidence to justify
intervention. See id. at 332. Even after cases are reported and investigated, follow-up proce-
dures are often not specified or implemented. John, supra note 1, § 19. In addition, penalties
for failing to report are not always imposed and, when imposed, are inconsistently enforced.
See id. § 24; see also BESHAROV, supra note 36, at 3 (affirming that few cases result in civil or
criminal action).
58. See SLOAN, supra note 43, at 16-17 (providing examples of statutory "purpose
clauses"). Once a report has been investigated and substantiated, the social service and crimi-
nal justice systems may intervene by removing the abused child from the home, terminating
parental rights, or enforcing some type of criminal sanction. See id. at 50-66, 75-88 (delineat-
ing the roles of the social service and criminal justice systems).
59. See John, supra note 1, §§ 11-12 (observing causes and effects of abuse).
60. See GELLES & CORNELL, supra note 27, at 19-20.
61. See id. at 51 (citing homicide as "one of the five leading causes of death for children
between the ages of one and eighteen years of age").
62. See id. at 60; see, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489
U.S. 189 (1989) (recognizing that repeated failures of the social service agency to remove peti-
tioner from his father's care resulted in severe beatings and permanent brain damage, render-
ing him profoundly retarded).
63. See John, supra note 1, §§ 9-12. Many researchers are of the opinion that, if un-
treated, abused children are more likely to become "delinquents, murderers, and batterers of
the next generation of children." GELLES & CORNELL, supra note 27, at 59 (citation omitted).
But see Mones, supra note 16, at 35 (asserting that a number of abused children do not grow
up and use violence).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51, 56-58. See generally Mones, supra note 16,
at 36-37 (discussing the predicament of abused children).
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the abuse, to escape, or to obtain assistance may take their own lives65 or the
lives of their abusers.66
B. Abused Children Who Kill
When children take the lives of parents, their actions may be better under-
stood if the entire context in which the killings occur is considered. The
limited study of parricide links most of the killings to occurrences of domes-
tic violence.67 More specifically, studies of abused children who kill abusive
parents identify several common characteristics, circumstances, and
consequences.68
1. The Study of Parricide
Each year, parricide accounts for an estimated three hundred deaths in
the United States.69 Because data indicate that approximately ninety per-
cent of the children who commit parricide have suffered combined forms of
65. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
66. One author notes that adolescence is a period in which a child is undergoing a sensi-
tive developmental process, and "[w]hen abuse is added to this mix, it exacerbates an already
confused, complicated period, thus making a violent reaction much more likely." MONES,
supra note 5, at 15; see also EWING, supra note 34, at 157 (suggesting "[j]uvenile killers are not
born but made").
67. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 70, 80 and accompanying
text. For a listing a various studies published on the subject of juveniles who kill, see EWING,
supra note 34, at 172. Although quite lengthy, the listing includes few studies that focus on
the issue of parricide. See id. There are generally thought to be three categories of motives for
a child taking the life of a parent: mental illness, greed, and abuse (consisting of physical,
sexual, or psychological abuse). See MONES, supra note 5, at 14-15. For the purposes of this
research, the focus is on the latter class. For accounts of mentally ill persons who have killed
parents, see GREGGORY W. MORRIS, THE KIDS NEXT DOOR: SONS AND DAUGHTERS WHO
KILL THEIR PARENTS 187-226 (1985). For an account of a child killing a parent because of
greed, see id. at 252-58.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 69-97.
69. See supra note 5; cf. Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 89 (estimating the figure at four
hundred deaths per year). Boys commit approximately ninety percent of all parricides.
MONES, supra note 5, at 25. The most common form is sons killing fathers, accounting for
roughly seventy percent of the homicides, with sons killing mothers comprising the next larg-
est category. See id. at 25, 46, 177. This should not be too surprising as studies indicate boys
are abused more often than are girls, and violence against boys is thought to be more accepta-
ble as it "toughens them up" and is a "character builder." STRAUS ET AL., supra note 27, at
68-69. The parricide figures are consistent with overall United States homicide statistics, gen-
erally showing that men are perpetrators in almost ninety percent of all homicides, while wo-
men are responsible for the remaining percent. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 5,
at 11. Also consistent with these figures, girls are responsible for the other ten percent of
parricide cases, with daughters killing fathers more often than mothers. See MONES, supra
note 5, at 25, 211. In some instances, parricide cases involve other scenarios. Id. at 12 (noting
that other scenarios may include sibling conspiracies, the killing of both parents or an entire
family, or parricide for hire).
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physical, psychological, and sexual abuse,7" the study of domestic violence,
child abuse, and incest has been instrumental in facilitating research on
abused children who take the lives of abusive parents. Within the last two
decades, a limited number of psychiatrists and psychologists began to focus
on parricide and, more recently, attention has come from the legal commu-
nity.7" ' Based on these efforts, it is possible to provide a profile on abused
children who kill abusive parents.
2. Characteristics, Circumstances, and Consequences
Abused children who kill their parents share many similar characteris-
tics.72 Child abuse-parricide defendants are usually from white, middle or
upper-middle class backgrounds,73 ranging in age from sixteen to eighteen
years old.74 Typically, the children have no history of delinquency or vio-
lent behavior.7 On the contrary, many are described as exemplary chil-
dren,7 6 submissive and peaceful,7 7 posing no threat to other members of
society at large.7" Most of the children function normally in school and are
average or above-average students.79 The children are generally subject to
unstable family relations and patterns of severe victimization by a parent,
suffering combined forms of abuse and witnessing the abuse of other family
70. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also EWING, supra note 34, at 8-9 (ob-
serving that witnessing spouse abuse and being personally abused are both extremely common,
and being a victim of domestic violence is "the single most consistent finding" in juvenile
killings).
71. For examples of psychiatrists and psychologists involved in the study of parricide, see
infra notes 80, 95. Regarding legal attention, see Moreno, supra note 16, at 1306-07 (advocat-
ing a legal defense for parricide defendants); Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 96-100 (same).
See generally Mones, supra note 16, at 31-38 (reviewing the legal response to child abuse-
parricide defendants); MONES, supra note 5, at 45-322 (providing dialogue and case-by-case
reviews of parricide cases and legal responses); EWING, supra note 34, at 15-30 (discussing
cases of youths who committed parricide).
72. MONES, supra note 5, at 12 (asserting that "the psychological and behavioral profile of
the child and the pattern of abuse are fairly predictable, as are the actual events which trig-
gered the killing").
73. Id. Children from poorer backgrounds are more apt to have public agencies involved
in their lives and are also more likely to know how to obtain help. In middle-to-upper middle
class families, abuse is more difficult to detect because the families "live in more isolated sur-
roundings" and are able to better protect themselves from public scrutiny. Id. at 163.
74. Id. at 12. Cases have been recorded where children as young as three and "children"
over the age twenty-one have committed parricides. In the latter class, mental illness or greed
are more likely to have been a factor. Id. at 14.
75. Mones, supra note 16, at 36.
76. EWING, supra note 34, at 19.
77. MONES, supra note 5, at 12.
78. See Mones, supra note 16, at 37; Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 93.
79. See MONES, supra note 5, at 12; Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 104.
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members."0 It is common to find that these children are denied or receive
little assistance, and that few options to end the abuse exist."' The children
often know that others are fully aware of the abuse but are unable or unwill-
ing to help.8 2
Most of the children seem to have very close relationships with their par-
ents and are frequently described as very compliant adolescents. 83 Psycholo-
gists note that the parents view the children as objects or pieces of property;
the children exist in order to satisfy the needs of the parents, having no
independent identity.8 4 Running away from home is not an option for many
of these children because of the existing emotional and social bonds with the
parents, or because of fear that other family members will be abused in their
absence.8 5 Even when the children do run away, they are often returned
home to their parents.8 6
Having endured the abuse, many of the children blame themselves for
their situations and are potentially suicidal.87 After repeated beatings and
threats, the children believe their lives to be in "mortal danger." 8 As a
result of these characteristics and circumstances, the children usually kill in
some combination of fear, revenge, or self-defense.8 9 The killings are com-
monly premeditated, brutal, and take place when the parent is in a non-
threatening position.9" Many children deny the killings and try to cover
80. MONES, supra note 5, at 12; see also Billie F. Corder et al., Adolescent Parricide: A
Comparison with Other Adolescent Murder, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 957, 959 (1976).
81. Mones, supra note 16, at 36-37 (recognizing difficulties that confront the youths); Van
Sambeek, supra note 16, at 93, 99-100 (stating assistance and response is usually ineffective,
and that there are a lack of alternatives, such as shelters for abused children).
82. An example may be when a mother is also a victim of abuse and is unable to help or
protect the child. See Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 100. In addition, others are often
ignorant of signs of abuse or reluctant to intervene. See id.; MONES, supra note 5, at 16, 95,
319.
83. See Lawrence Meyer, Kids Who Kill Parents, WASH. POST, May 13, 1984 (Magazine),
at 15-16 (describing how "[a] tight bond, like that between master and slave, develops").
84. See id. at 15; MONES, supra note 5, at 13.
85. MONES, supra note 5, at 36-37, 41-42; see also MORRIS, supra note 67, at 154 (ex-
plaining the dilemma faced by children who contemplate running away). But see EWING,
supra note 34, at 9 (revealing that "running away from home has been reported almost exclu-
sively in juveniles who eventually killed one of their parents").
86. See, e.g., State v. Stanberry, No. 90-1022, slip op. at 5 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 1991).
87. Mones, supra note 16, at 36 (referring to the children as "potentially suicidal"); Van
Sambeek, supra note 16, at 93 (describing children who commit parricide as often "more sui-
cidal than homicidal").
88. MORRIS, supra note 67, at 293.
89. See, e.g., Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1010 (Wyo. 1984) (Brown, J., concurring)
(noting that Jahnke claimed, at different times, that he was motivated by revenge, self-defense,
and fear).
90. See MONES, supra note 5, at 14, 106 (describing circumstances under which these
children kill). It is typical for a child to "shoot, club, or stab the parent numerous times,"
especially while the parent is in a non-threatening position. Id. at 14. In many parricide cases,
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them up, but eventually confess to the acts.91 Based on such factors, parrici-
dal killings typically appear to be first-degree murder.92
After taking the life of an abusive parent, the children usually experience a
sense of freedom and safety because the parent and the heightened sense of
fear are gone.93 Yet, many of the children remain confused and tend to deny
the extent of the abuse they endured and, again, become suicidal.94 Most of
these children are amenable to treatment and, thereafter, are able to adjust
relatively well.95 With treatment, the children may confront their situations,
learn that they were not responsible for the abuse, and that violence is not
the answer to dealing with problems.96 The children, however, must also
accept their share of responsibility for the parricide. 97
When examining the social, legal, and psychological dynamics of abuse
and the profile of abused children who kill abusive parents, the connection
between child abuse and parricide becomes evident.9" Developing a pro-
gram to effectively prevent, intervene, and correct existing problems requires
attention to the underlying causes, characteristics, circumstances, and conse-
quences outlined above.99 In the interim, analyses of parricide cases must
encompass evaluations of the entire context in which the crimes occur in
order to determine how best to deal with abused children who take the lives
of abusive parents.
overkill is common because of the child's fear that the parent will retaliate, not because of the
child's desire to injure the parent. Id. at 106.
91. See Jonathan Groner, Why Do Kids Become Killers?, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1991, at
46 (reviewing MONES, supra note 5).
92. MONES, supra note 5, at 61; see also supra note 10 (discussing the offense of first-
degree murder).
93. MONES, supra note 5, at 321.
94. Id. at 312. For example, many parricide youths spoke of suicide or tried to kill them-
selves within six months of the murder. Id. at 326.
95. See id at 320; see also Corder et al., supra note 80, at 959 (positing that data from a
study of ten parricidal adolescents showed that the "group had adjusted well outside prison
with minimum psychiatric treatment and intervention"); Jane W. Duncan & Glen M. Duncan,
Murder in the Family: A Study of Some Homicidal Adolescents, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1498,
1501-02 (1971) (indicating that after the child has killed the family member, the source of the
problem no longer exists and the child may no longer be a threat).
96. MONES, supra note 5, at 320; Post, supra note 6, at 452.
97. MONES, supra note 5, at 320.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 27-89; see also Moreno, supra note 16, at 1299-
1306 (examining the link between child abuse and parricide); Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at
91 (noting "that there is an amazingly high correlation between [child abuse and parricide]").
99. See Post, supra note 6, at 454 (discussing how parricide cases raise the issues of child
abuse detection and prevention).
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II. ASSESSING THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE-PARRICIDE
DEFENDANTS: BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL, A
FOUNDATION FOR ANALYSIS
Battered women and children face similar difficulties as the responses of
societal, social service, and criminal justice systems have inadequately ad-
dressed the problems faced by both groups."o° After suffering continued
abuse and confronting the prevailing societal attitudes and inadequate re-
sponses, abused women and children show characteristics and behavioral
patterns that resemble one another."' When abused women and children
resort to self-help and take the lives of their abusers, the circumstances sur-
rounding the killings are similar as well.' °2 Based on the likenesses in un-
derlying causes, characteristics, and circumstances, it is possible to draw
compelling analogies between battered women and battered children. Be-
cause of these analogies, and because the degree of recognition and aware-
ness extended to battered women has not been paralleled for children, courts
and commentators often use battered women cases as a foundation for exam-
ining cases of parricide.
10 3
A. Defending Battered Women Who Kill
Skilled advocacy on behalf of battered women has resulted in a better un-
derstanding of battering relationships, and continuous efforts have improved
the ability of the current system to respond to the problems of abuse."°
However, when prevention and intervention are unsuccessful, some women
resort to self-help and take the lives of their abusers."°5 Prior to the 1970s,
these defendants tended to rely on the complete defense of insanity, or one of
100. For responses to problems of child abuse, see supra text accompanying notes 27-58.
For materials specifically relating to responses to battered women, see Lisa G. Lerman, Media-
tion of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984) (reviewing the nature of wife abuse together with traditional
and contemporary responses to the abuse); Lynn A. Sacco, Wife Abuse: The Failure of Legal
Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 549 (1978); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal
Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
623, 624-30 (1980) (discussing societal attitudes and legal origins of woman abuse).
101. Mones, supra note 16, at 37; Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 97 n.88. For a profile on
abused children who kill abusive parents, see supra text accompanying notes 72-97. For a
profile on battered women who kill, see supra note 19; Cipparone, supra note 15, at 431-32
(noting characteristics of battered women who kill).
102. Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 93 (describing similarities between battered women
and children who kill).
103. See materials cited supra note 16.
104. See generally Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering:
Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 267-69 & nn.2 & 7
(1985) (contending that efforts on behalf of battered women have led to improvements in socie-
tal, social service, and criminal justice responses).
105. See generally materials cited supra note 15.
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several mitigating defenses." ° When traditional legal doctrine was strictly
applied, battered women who killed were customarily prosecuted for murder
or manslaughter. 7 During the late 1970s, defense attorneys began to chal-
lenge traditional legal doctrine and explore other alternatives for defending
battered women charged with killing their abusers.' 0 8 Today, battered wo-
men typically claim self-defense and seek acquittal.
1. The Doctrine of Self-Defense
Professors LaFave and Scott, leading authorities on the subject of criminal
law, explain that the law recognizes the right to use deadly force against an
unlawful aggressor in self-defense when there is no opportunity to resort to
the criminal justice system."° Self-defense is a complete defense to homi-
cide and, if proven, the defendant is not guilty of any crime."' Under the
traditional model, similarly defined in most jurisdictions, a killing is justified:
(1) if the killer had a reasonable belief of an imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury; and (2) if reasonable force was necessary to prevent
such harm."' The modern trend is for abused women charged with killing
their abusers to seek to justify the acts as self-defense.1 12 The circumstances
surrounding the death of an abusive spouse may, in some cases, provide suffi-
cient evidence to satisfy the requirements of the traditional self-defense
106. Battered women historically relied on impaired mental state defenses such as insanity
or diminished capacity. See Schneider & Jordan, supra note 15, at 159. Insanity is a complete
defense to homicide that results in conviction or acquittal, while diminished capacity is usually
only a mitigating defense. See id. at 159 & n.85. However, battered women who kill became
frustrated with both defenses as the defendants could be committed to mental institutions for
indefinite periods of time. See id. at 159-60. Battered women defendants have also argued the
killings occurred in a heat of passion. This defense was used most often to reduce a charge of
first-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. See id. at 153, 159; see also infra notes 123-29
and accompanying text (discussing heat of passion manslaughter). See generally Mitchell,
supra note 15, at 1722-25 (analyzing defenses of insanity, diminished capacity, and provoca-
tion/heat of passion).
107. See Rosen, supra note 15, at 13.
108. Id. at 14, 36. The resulting theory is referred to as the "battered woman's defense."
Id. at 14; see also supra note 19.
109. LAFAVE & ScoIr, supra note 10, § 5.7(a).
110. Id. In order to evaluate a claim of self-defense, a judge or jury will determine if the
elements of reasonableness are satisfied based on either an objective or subjective standard.
Rosen, supra note 15, at 31. In theory, a majority of jurisdictions apply an objective standard.
See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 10, § 5.7(c)-(d).
111. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 10, § 5.7, at 454 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the
person claiming self-defense generally must not have been the aggressor. Id. § 5.7(e). A few
jurisdictions require that the person must have had no opportunity to safely retreat. Id.
§ 5.7(0.
112. See Bennett, supra note 14, at 960; Mihajlovich, supra note 15, at 1253.
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model, as when the killing occurs during an abusive attack." 3 Often, how-
ever, the killings occur in situations in which the evidence does not conform
with this model; for example, when the killing occurs between attacks and
the abuser is passive or asleep.
14
The difficulties encountered in meeting strict self-defense standards led
many battered women to offer lay and expert testimony to aid the trier of
fact in comprehending the entire context of the crime." 5 Claims of self-
defense in non-confrontational situations, with expert testimony to support
such claims, remain debatable and create controversy as to whether self-
defense is a viable option. 1 6 Nonetheless, battered women who kill prefer to
claim self-defense because it is a complete defense that results in acquittal
when all elements of the doctrine are satisfied." 7 Battered women continue
to argue that the resort to self-help was reasonable and necessary, suggesting
that they have been failed by society and left with a decision to kill or be
killed. I I8
While most battered women prefer to argue self-defense to gain acquittal,
several scholars contend that battered women are stretching self-defense be-
113. See Bates, supra note 15, at 927; Cipparone, supra note 15, at 434-36; see, e.g., State v.
Lynch, 436 So. 2d 567 (La. 1983) (defendant killed husband while trying to retreat from a
physical attack).
114. See Bates, supra note 15, at 927; Cipparone, supra note 15, at 436-39; see, e.g, State v.
Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. 1986) (defendant killed husband as he lay on the bed following
a day of sexual abuse); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814 (N.D. 1983) (defendant killed
husband as he slept).
115. See Rosen, supra note 15, at 36-41. In many cases, lay testimony may be introduced
to establish the existence of a specific pattern of violence in the individual case. See Schneider,
supra note 100, at 644-45 (arguing that such testimony is crucial in order to understand the
circumstances surrounding the act and the defendant's own perceptions). Expert testimony on
the battered woman syndrome may be introduced as well in order to assist the judge or jury in
understanding common experiences, characteristics, and perceptions of battered women. See
supra note 19. This testimony, in effect, is meant to demonstrate the reasonableness of force
used, or the reasonableness of a perception of "imminent" danger. See Rosen, supra note 15,
at 41; Bates, supra note 15, at 929-32. For example, in non-confrontational situations, the
testimony may support an instruction and claim of self-defense by proving that the history of
abuse may heighten a victim's fear and knowledge of impending danger such that the abuser is
as threatening in a non-confrontational situation as during an attack. See Bates, supra note 15,
at 930-31; Madison, supra note 15, at 1031-32.
116. Serious debate remains as to the extent and circumstances under which battered wo-
man syndrome testimony may be admissible, especially in reference to non-confrontational
situations. Most courts allow testimony in traditional cases but exclude the testimony in non-
confrontational situations. See Bates, supra note 15, at 927. For a listing of courts which have
addressed and ruled on admissibility, see Madison, supra note 15, at 1032-36 & nn.48-51.
117. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 10, § 5.7(a).
118. Rosen, supra note 15, at 38. See generally Buda & Butler, supra note 15, at 360
(stating that the "decision" is really no decision at all as they are often left with no other
choice); Eber, supra note 15, at 930 (arguing that battered women kill their abusers as a last
resort in order to end abuse and avoid death from further abuse).
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yond its acceptable limits. 1I9 They argue that the self-defense doctrine is
designed to protect the sanctity of human life and to limit self-help, which is
accomplished by the doctrine's strict requirements of necessity, proportion,
and imminence.1 20 These same scholars assert that allowing claims of self-
defense in non-confrontational circumstances, with expert testimony to
support such claims, and granting acquittal is likely to create "an open sea-
son on men" 12 1 and sanction vigilantism.12 2 Contrary to the arguments of
battered women, such scholars suggest a balanced approach in which the
underlying causes, characteristics, and circumstances become mitigating fac-
tors to reduce a homicide charge from first-degree murder to voluntary
manslaughter.
2. Reducing the Charge: Murder to Manslaughter
Instead of claiming self-defense, a battered woman may seek the reduction
of a first-degree murder charge to one of voluntary manslaughter when ex-
tenuating circumstances exist.' 2 3 According to LaFave and Scott, man-
slaughter is a separate and distinct crime and has been described as those
"homicides which are not bad enough to be murder but which are too bad to
be no crime whatever."'
124
The most common form of voluntary manslaughter is a killing that occurs
in a "heat of passion."' 125 Most jurisdictions classify the killing as an inten-
119. See generally Creach, supra note 15, at 627-30 (arguing that acquittal, despite a lack
of sufficient evidence to support self-defense, is contrary to the rule of law); Mitchell, supra
note 15, at 1725, 1731 (contending that allowing self-defense in battered women cases when
the requirements are not met justifies homicide when the acts "cannot be distinguished from
revenge"); Rittenmeyer, supra note 15, at 390 (asserting that battered women are attempting
to replace imminence requirements with rationales of future harm and inadequate responses).
120. See Creach, supra note 15, at 628 (noting that the restrictions of the self-defense doc-
trine are meant to deter self-help and require a genuine fear of imminence); Mihajlovich, supra
note 15, at 1269 n.98 (asserting that the social goal of the self-defense doctrine is to preserve
human life, and "[to erode the proportionality and necessity components... is to broaden the
range of circumstances under which a life can legally be taken without criminal sanctions").
121. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 15, at 150 n.4 (quoting Peter S. Greenberg, Thirteen
Ways to Leave Your Lover, NEW TIMES, Feb. 6, 1978, at 6). See generally Rittenmeyer, supra
note 15, at 390 (claiming that allowing self-defense gives battered women the right to murder
at will); see also Rosen, supra note 15, at 52 (discussing the resort to self-help, if justified, is
against societal interests as it encourages similar conduct from others).
122. See generally Creach, supra note 15, at 627 n.55 (asserting that "[t]here have been
disquieting indications of vigilantism in the battered wife setting"); Mihajlovich, supra note 15,
at 1269 n.98 (stating that "[t]o acquiesce to battered women, and allow them to kill their
abusers to end the abuse, is to encourage similar action by others"); Taylor, supra note 15, at
1705 (setting forth the opposition to claims of self-defense for battered women who kill).
123. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 10, § 7.10.
124. Id. § 7.9.
125. See id. § 7.10; see also supra note 106 (mentioning another method by which to miti-
gate the killing to manslaughter, referred to as diminished capacity). Another common form
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tional homicide, taking place under extenuating circumstances which miti-
gate, but do not excuse or justify, the act.' 26 The extenuating circumstance
is usually created by a provocation of another which would have caused a
reasonable person to lose control.1 27 To prevail, the defendant must prove:
(1) that there was reasonable provocation, (2) that did in fact provoke the
defendant, (3) that a reasonable person would not have cooled off in the inter-
val between the provocation and the fatal attack, and (4) that the defendant
had not in fact cooled off.' 2 To prove these elements, battered women may
attempt to introduce lay and expert testimony to support their claims. 29
Although battered women who kill their abusers prefer a complete de-
fense, several scholars maintain that some form of voluntary manslaughter,
rather than self-defense, is the appropriate legal response to the killings.
These scholars argue that extenuating circumstances, such as a history of
abuse and societal failures, may be recognized in order to reduce a charge
from murder to manslaughter.' 30 As a balanced approach, classifying the
offense as voluntary manslaughter recognizes both crimes in the context in
of mitigation from first-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter is an imperfect self-defense
claim. See, e.g., State v. Norris, 279 S.E.2d 570 (N.C. 1981) (battered woman case); State v.
Stanberry, No. 90-1022 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 1991) (battered child case). Some jurisdictions
recognize this doctrine and mitigate the charge when the defendant used reasonable force and
had an honest, but unreasonable, belief of imminent danger. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 10, § 7.11(a); Taylor, supra note 15, at 1707-11. Other jurisdictions may allow this de-
fense when the imperfection is the defendant's failure to meet the reasonable force require-
ment. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, § 7.11(a); Taylor, supra note 15, at 1707-11.
Here, too, lay and expert testimony may be introduced with such claims. For example, the
testimony may be offered to prove that the battered woman used reasonable force or held an
honest belief of imminent danger. See Mihajlovich, supra note 15, at 1280.
126. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 10, § 7.10.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 7.10(a) (emphasis added). In determining whether manslaughter has occurred,
American jurisdictions differ in evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct: most
apply an objective standard, while others apply a more subjective standard. See id. § 7.10(b),
at 654 & n.13.
129. For example, in order to show that a history of abuse culminating with the most
recent attack constituted reasonable provocation, the testimony may be offered to prove that
the woman acted reasonably and within the cooling off period. Mihajlovich, supra note 15, at
1279 (asserting a battered woman may likely have an extended cooling off period).
130. See generally Creach, supra note 15, at 635-38 (arguing for expansion of the doctrine
of imperfect self-defense to include killings in response to external forces sufficient to put the
defendant in genuine fear); Mihajlovich, supra note 15, at 1278-81 (explaining various strate-
gies for categorizing murders by battered women of their attackers in non-confrontational situ-
ations as manslaughter where a defendant's status as a battered woman would be recognized as
an extenuating circumstance, and arguing that such classification will allow battered women
defendants to include their true emotions, such as anger and fear, in their defenses to establish
the reasonableness of their feelings of helplessness); Shad, supra note 15, at 1176 (contending
that the legislature should broaden its voluntary manslaughter offense to include a new ground
where the battered woman syndrome has been established); Taylor, supra note 15, at 1726-34
(advocating that the definition of heat of passion manslaughter be broadened to include such
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which they occur: categorizing the abuse as a mitigating circumstance, while
at the same time preserving the intent of the self-defense doctrine by
stressing the sanctity of human life and discouraging self-help.131
B. Responding to Child Abuse-Parricide Defendants
Claims in parricide cases have been slower to develop, yet have followed a
similar pattern to those in cases of battered women who kill. 132 As with
battered women, abused children who kill their abusers prefer to seek acquit-
tal by arguing that the killings are justified as self-defense,' 33 while offering
lay and expert testimony to support their claims.' 34 Thus, the same contro-
versial issues presented in cases of battered women who kill exist in child
abuse-parricide cases,'3 5 and similarly disparate outcomes result.
external influences as the battered woman's syndrome, and the entire context in which the
crimes occur).
131. This balanced approach avoids the extreme outcomes of the self-defense doctrine-
conviction of first-degree murder or acquittal. See Creach, supra note 15, at 634 (noting that
the self-defense "polar model is inadequate," while manslaughter provides a "middle
ground"); Mihajlovich, supra note 15, at 1278 (claiming that manslaughter is a compromise
between opposing interests); Shad, supra note 15, at 1177 (contending manslaughter balances
"individualized justice for the battered woman and general deterrence of uncontrolled self-
help").
132. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08. Determining how to deal with a child
who has committed parricide will depend on many factors. These factors may include, but are
not limited to: the unique circumstances surrounding the death; the state in which the homi-
cide occurs; the judge before whom the case is heard; the quality of representation; the defense
used; the makeup of the jury; and the evidence of the severity and history of abuse. See Lois
Timnick, Fatal Means for Children to End Abuse: Parricide Cases Evoke Conflict in Sympathy,
Need for Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1986, at B2. Other factors may include whether
the child is tried as a juvenile or an adult, the offense charged, the motions entertained by the
court, the plea bargaining process, and the admissibility of lay and expert testimony.
133. See Moreno, supra note 16, at 1285; Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 91.
134. The testimony is offered to explain how the children's perceptions of and responses to
imminent danger differ from persons who have not suffered abuse. See, e.g., Jahnke v. State,
682 P.2d 991, 1043 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting); see also Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at
97. Recently, some courts have begun to recognize this expert testimony as admissible evi-
dence to aid the trier of fact in evaluating the defendant's perception of being in imminent
danger (as advocated by battered children who kill and claim self-defense). See, e.g., State v.
Janes, 822 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Wash. Ct. App.), review granted, 832 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1992)
(recognizing expert testimony on the effects of child abuse as admissible in "appropriate
cases"). However, most courts do not allow the testimony under non-confrontational circum-
stances. See, e.g., Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1007 (explaining that in the absence of imminent danger
such evidence is properly excluded). See generally supra note 19 (providing information on the
use of expert testimony by battered defendants).
135. See Moreno, supra note 16, at 1285-90 (discussing the use of self-defense and expert
testimony in cases in which battered children have killed abusive parents); Van Sambeek,
supra note 16, at 91-100 (equating use of self-defense and expert testimony in parricide cases
with cases of battered women who kill).
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1. The Historical Approach
An example of the historical analysis used in a parricide case is illustrated
by the 1954 case of State v. Beard.'36 In Beard, the New Jersey Superior
Court convicted the defendant of first-degree murder for the death of his
mother and imposed the death sentence.137 On appeal, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey sustained the lower court.' 3 ' According to the supreme
court, there was no need to determine why the crime had been committed
because the nature of the crime, coupled with the manner in which it was
executed and the defendant's confession, provided ample proof that the mur-
der was willful, premeditated, and deliberate.' 39 In its opinion, the court
stated that "[t]he killing of one's own mother has horror written in its very
thought and the circumstances involved, to say the least, are exceptional and
lastingly impressive.""
The Beard decision is indicative of the shock and denial that have tradi-
tionally accompanied parricide cases.'' Not all of the specific facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the crime are documented because the court was
not concerned with analyzing the context in which the crime occurred. The
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree murder and
the imposition of the death penalty, and therefore no other considerations
were addressed. This case is unquestionably harsh and extreme in outcome,
yet it reinforces the historical attitudes regarding family matters.' 4 2 As re-
flected in Beard, this historical approach fails to deal with the defendant's
behavior in the entire context in which the crime occurred.
43
2. Application of Traditional Legal Doctrine
Since the Beard decision, some courts considering parricide cases have
been willing to recognize the context in which the crime occurred, but refuse
to recognize claims of self-defense or allow mitigating circumstances to re-
duce a charge of first-degree murder. Whipple v. State'" is a fairly recent
example of the strict application of the traditional self-defense doctrine. In
136. 106 A.2d 265 (N.J. 1954).
137. Id. at 267.
138. Id. at 270.
139. See id.; see also supra note 10 (defining first-degree murder).
140. Id.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
143. See MONES, supra note 5, at 5 (recognizing the Beard case as "typical" of the histori-
cal treatment of parricide cases); see also Groner, supra note 91, at 46 (suggesting that it is
"hard to conceive of any societal goal, except for sheer retribution, that is aided by such draco-
nian results").
144. 523 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind. 1988), habeas corpus denied, Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d
418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 218 (1992).
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Whipple, the defendant, seventeen year old Dale Whipple, killed his mother
and father with an axe, and was subsequently charged with two counts of
murder. 
1 45
Although the trial court was presented with evidence of seventeen years of
physical and emotional abuse inflicted by Dale's parents 4 6 as well as several
failed attempts by Dale to seek assistance to end the abuse,' 4 7 the trial judge
rejected a claim of self-defense on the basis that there was no evidence of an
imminent danger at the time of the killings. 4 ' Dale was found guilty but
mentally ill on both counts of murder 49 and sentenced to concurrent terms
of imprisonment: forty years for the death of his mother and thirty years for
the death of his father.'5 ° On appeal, Dale argued that the trial court erred
in refusing an instruction on self-defense.' 5 ' The Indiana Supreme Court
rejected the claim and affirmed the lower court,' 5 2 concluding that although
Dale may have been a victim of abuse and believed it necessary to use deadly
force to prevent further abuse, there was no proof of imminent danger at the
time of the killing upon which an instruction on self-defense could be
based. 1
53
In a similar case, State v. Reid, 54 defendant Sandra Reid took the life of
her physically, emotionally, and sexually abusive father, killing him as he
slept. '5 At trial, Sandra's claim of self-defense centered around her fear of
her father, heightened by a long history of violence.' 5 6 Although the court
instructed the jury on self-defense, Sandra was convicted of first-degree mur-
der. "' She appealed this decision, claiming that the trial court erred in fail-
145. Id. at 1365-66.
146. The physical abuse, usually inflicted by "the board" or "the two-by-four," was also
accompanied by constant and threatening verbal abuse, threats of death from his father, and
sexually provocative behavior toward Dale by his mother. See generally Brief for Appellant at
4-19, Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.) (No. 91-1087) (discussing Dale's history
of abuse), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 218 (1992).
147. See id. at 4, 19-23 (providing information on Dale's attempts to seek help).
148. Whipple, 523 N.E.2d at 1367. Dale's attorney argued for an instruction on self-de-
fense based on the history of abuse and Dale's reasonable belief of imminent harm. Id. at
1366.
149. Id. at 1365. The jury was instructed on the verdicts of guilty, guilty but mentally ill,
and not guilty by reason of insanity. See MONES, supra note 5, at 271. In explaining its
verdict, the jury noted that it recognized Dale was not solely responsible for the act and its
intention was that Dale receive treatment rather than a prison term. See id. at 272.
150. Whipple, 523 N.E.2d at 1365; see also MONES, supra note 5, at 274.
151. Whipple, 523 N.E.2d at 1366.
152. Id. at 1367.
153. Id.
154. 747 P.2d 560 (Ariz. 1987).
155. See id. at 561.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 561, 563.
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ing to instruct the jury on the crime of manslaughter.' The Supreme
Court of Arizona rejected this claim stating that no evidence existed to sup-
port an instruction on a lesser offense.' 59
The decisions in Whipple and Reid are indicative of the unsatisfactory
outcomes that result by blindly applying traditional legal doctrine. The evi-
dence, on its face, objectively fell within the definition of first-degree murder
and no allowance was made for self-defense claims or extenuating factors.'6°
Approaches such as Whipple and Reid, like that in Beard, successfully sat-
isfy the self-defense doctrine's objectives of preserving human life and limit-
ing self-help, but fail to analyze or respond to the context in which the
crimes occurred.
3. Confronting the Issues: Self-Defense, Expert Testimony, Extenuating
Circumstances
In contrast to Whipple and Reid, the court in Jahnke v. State 161 directly
confronted the issues surrounding application of the self-defense doctrine,
with expert testimony on the effects of child abuse to support such a claim,
and recognition of a history of child abuse as a mitigating factor by which to
reduce a charge of murder to one of voluntary manslaughter. ,62 In Jahnke,
the defendant, sixteen year old Richard Jahnke, waited for his father to re-
158. Id. at 562.
159. Id. According to the court, evidence was insufficient to support a killing that was
reckless, occurred in a heat of passion, or was adequately provoked. Id. Further, the state
cross-appealed, claiming error in the lower court's instruction on self-defense. Id. at 563. The
supreme court agreed with the state and held the instruction improper. Id. at 564. The court
reasoned that because Sandra killed her father while he was sleeping, there could not have been
a reasonable fear or "immediacy of physical danger." Id.
160. See supra note 10 (defining first-degree murder). In Whipple, the court made refer-
ence to, but did not focus on the tragedy of abuse and the failure of society to respond. The
court stated:
We are cognizant of the tragedy experienced by the victims of battering relationships
and all too frequent failure of social and law enforcement institutions to provide
timely aid, comfort, and assistance to such victims. However, we are inescapably
confronted here with conduct constituting the statutory offense of murder. The
crimes cannot be condoned or excused on the basis of self-defense or defense of
others.
Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1988), habeas corpus denied, Whipple v. Duck-
worth, 957 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 218 (1992). In Reid, the court stated
that "[w]hatever might have occurred before the victim retired for the evening is immaterial."
747 P.2d at 562 (emphasis added).
161. 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984).
162. Id. at 993.
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turn home and then shot and killed him as he emerged from the family
car.163 Richard was charged with first-degree murder."'
At Richard's trial, his claim of self-defense centered around the many
years of abuse inflicted by his father.1 6 Based on this evidence and Rich-
ard's failed attempts to end the abuse, the trial court instructed the jury on
self-defense, but excluded expert testimony which was meant to show the
reasonableness of Richard's conduct. 166 The court concluded that the evi-
dence did not satisfy the strict requirements of the self-defense doctrine,
although the history of abuse Richard suffered did amount to an extenuating
factor by which to reduce the offense charged.1 67 Richard was adjudged
guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to five to fifteen years in
prison.
168
On appeal, Richard argued that the court had erred in excluding the ex-
pert testimony. 169 The Supreme Court of Wyoming disagreed and affirmed
the opinion of the lower court, 7 ° stating that because there was no evidence
of an actual or threatened assault, the reasonableness of Richard's conduct
was not an issue and the expert testimony was properly excluded. 7 One of
two separate dissenting opinions provided a detailed and lengthy discussion
on the merits of expert testimony and its use to support claims of self-defense
for battered women and children who kill their abusers in non-confronta-
tional situations.1
72
Although the Jahnke case represents the emergence of dialogue concern-
ing utilization of expert testimony on the effects of child abuse to support
163. Id. at 994-95.
164. Id. at 994. Richard and his sister, Deborah, were charged with conspiracy to commit
murder as well. Id. Richard was found not guilty of this charge. Id. Deborah was convicted
on this charge and was sentenced to up to eight years in prison, which was upheld by the
Wyoming Supreme Court. In December, 1984, however, Governor Ed Herschler commuted
her prison sentence and ordered her on probation for one year. Mother Sees Future for Chil-
dren Spared Sentence in Slaying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1984, at D24; see also infra note 223
(referring to the June 1984 commutation of Richard's sentence).
165. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1018-25 (Rose, J., dissenting). Evidence showed that Mr. Jahnke
had routinely and brutally beaten and emotionally abused his family, and had sexually abused
Richard's sister. Id. Further evidence revealed that both children feared their father and had
unsuccessfully attempted to seek help from their mother and local authorities. See id; see also
EWING, supra note 34, at 15.
166. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1002, 1004-05.
167. See id. at 994.
168. Id. at 994-95.
169. Id. at 995.
170. Id. at 1007.
171. Id.
172. See generally id. at 1011-44 (Rose, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1044 (Cardine, J.,
dissenting) (joining the dissent of Justice Rose in finding error in the exclusion of testimony).
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claims of self-defense by defendants in parricide cases, 173 the court held that
such testimony will not be admissible to support a self-defense claim in a
non-confrontational situation. 174 Ultimately, the Jahnke majority, like the
courts in Whipple and Reid, reasoned that the circumstances immediately
surrounding the crime did not satisfy the elements of the self-defense doc-
trine.'" Each court applied the strict requirements of the doctrine to the
facts, and concluded that when no immediate threat is present at the time of
the killing, a defendant is not justified in taking a human life, despite the fact
that the defendant is a battered child and the victim is the batterer.
176
Apart from examining the issue of expert testimony, the Jahnke decision
also differs from Whipple and Reid in that the court recognized the history
of abuse suffered by the defendant and allowed for a reduction of the charge
of murder to one of voluntary manslaughter. This result, advocated by
scholars opposing the use of self-defense and expert testimony by battered
defendants who kill their abusers in non-confrontational situations, recog-
nizes both crimes by categorizing the abuse as an extenuating circumstance
to reduce the offense, while preserving the intent of the self-defense doctrine
by stressing the sanctity of human life and discouraging self-help.'
77
4. Allowing Claims of Self-Defense and Expert Testimony
Confronted with the same controversial issues of self-defense and expert
testimony as presented in the Jahnke case, an appellate court in the State of
Washington recently released an unprecedented opinion overturning the
conviction of a sixteen year old boy who admitted to killing his stepfather in
State v. Janes.'78 As his stepfather walked through the front door of their
home one day, the defendant, Andy Janes, shot and killed him.179 Andy
was charged with first-degree murder.'
80
At trial, evidence demonstrated that Andy had been physically abused by
his stepfather for almost ten years, and that the state's child protective serv-
173. The debate in the Jahnke opinions dealt with the battered children's perceptions of
their abusive situations, the use of self-defense, and the use of expert testimony to support self-
defense claims in non-confrontational situations. This closely corresponds with the debate
surrounding battered women who kill. See supra text accompanying notes 112-22.
174. See Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1007 (holding exclusion of the testimony as proper due to a
lack of proof of imminent threat).
175. See supra text accompanying note 111; see also supra note 160 (discussing the Whip-
ple and Reid decisions); supra note 174 (discussing the Jahnke decision).
176. See Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1010 (Brown, J., concurring) (arguing that "[a]rming and
barricading [oneself) and lying in wait for ... [the victim's] return is not self-defense under the
law").
177. See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
178. 822 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Wash. Ct. App.), review granted, 832 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1992).
179. Id. at 1240.
180. Id.
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ices organization had been aware of the abuse.""1 The trial court refused to
allow a claim of self-defense or expert testimony to support the claim be-
cause no imminent danger was shown to exist at the time of the killing."8 2
Andy was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to ten years
in prison.1
8 3
On appeal, Andy argued that the court had erred in disallowing an in-
struction on self-defense and in excluding expert testimony to support the
claim.18 4 The appellate court held that imminence does not require an im-
mediate threat and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to allow the
instruction and the expert testimony.' 8 5 The case was remanded so that the
jury could hear the testimony to better understand the effects of abuse on a
child before specifically evaluating the reasonableness of Andy's actions and
his claim of self-defense.'8 6 In deciding Janes, the Washington Court of Ap-
peals, analogizing to cases in which battered women kill their abusers, be-
came the first appellate court to recognize expert testimony in the context
advocated by parricide defendants claiming self-defense in non-confronta-
tional situations.
18 7
Similarly, in a recent case in Texas, seventeen year old Donna Marie
Wisener had been physically, emotionally, and sexually abused by her father
for approximately fourteen years.1 8 After an argument with her father,
Donna Marie retrieved his gun and killed him. 89 Donna Marie was
charged with first-degree murder, and she offered evidence of prior abuse
and expert testimony on the effects of the abuse to support a claim of self-
defense. 190 However, in the Wisener case, the trial court allowed the testi-
mony and, after the presentation of all evidence, acquitted Donna Marie of
181. Id. at 1240-41.
182. Id. at 1241.
183. Id. at 1240.
184. Id. at 1239.
185. Id. at 1241 & n.5 (emphasis added). The court stated that "there need be no evidence
of an actual physical assault to demonstrate the immediacy of danger." Id. at 1241. Rather,
the determination is based on a subjective standard using the defendant's "perceived immi-
nence of danger." Id. at 1242 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 1243-44.
187. See Mark Hansen, Battered Child's Defense: Youths Who Killed Relatives Offer Evi-
dence of Abuse with Mixed Results, A.B.A. J., May 1992, at 28; David Margolick, When Child
Kills Parent, It's Sometimes to Survive, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 14, 1992, at D20.
188. See Hansen, supra note 187, at 28; Margolick, supra note 187, at Al.
189. Hansen, supra note 187, at 28; Margolick, supra note 187, at D20.
190. See Hansen, supra note 187, at 28; Margolick, supra note 187, at Al. A new Texas
law permits a defendant charged with the murder or manslaughter of a family member to
introduce evidence of a history of abuse, and expert testimony on the effects of the abuse. See
Hansen, supra note 187, at 28; Margolick, supra note 187, at Al.
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her father's murder, 191 thus producing the outcome advocated by battered
women and children charged with killing their abusers.' 92 In both Janes
and Wisener, the courts accepted arguments that allowed expert testimony
to prove the existence of an imminent threat when no immediate danger was
present at the time of the killings, thereby permitting successful self-defense
claims to be made in non-confrontational situations. 193
The foregoing cases, with the exception of Jahnke, 94 illustrate the ex-
treme and unsatisfactory results that have been obtained in parricide cases.
The approach followed in Beard, Whipple, and Reid fails to take into ac-
count all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the parricides, and em-
phasizes only the narrow goals of preserving human life and limiting self-
help.' 95 The Janes and Wisener decisions illustrate the opposite extreme.
Allowing self-defense claims in non-confrontational situations, and expert
testimony on the effects of abuse to support such claims, focuses primarily
on the abuse inflicted on the defendants and defeats the purposes of the strict
requirements of the self-defense doctrine. 196 Neither convictions of first-de-
gree murder nor acquittals by reason of self-defense are appropriate, desira-
ble, or effective in most parricide cases.
The Jahnke decision, on the other hand, appears to be a balanced ap-
proach that adheres to the objectives of the self-defense doctrine, while also
making allowance for the context in which the crime occurred. 197 However,
this balancing refers to the classification of the offense, not the type of sen-
tence imposed. Before any determination is made regarding the appropriate-
ness of a legal response, other considerations must be analyzed, evaluated,
and applied.
191. Hansen, supra note 187, at 28; Margolick, supra note 187, at Al. Five other states
permit such evidence by law, but only with regard to abused women. Hansen, supra note 187,
at 28; Margolick, supra note 187, at Al.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
193. See Hansen, supra note 187, at 28; Margolick, supra note 187, at D20. The court in
Janes, which has recognized battered woman syndrome testimony to support claims of self-
defense, recognized expert testimony on the effects of abuse on battered children as "the func-
tional and legal equivalent of the battered woman syndrome." State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238,
1243 (Wash. Ct. App.), review granted, 832 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1992).
194. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 120, 141-43; supra note 160 and accompanying
text.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11; supra notes 119-22 and accompanying
text.
197. See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
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III. TOWARD A MORE APPROPRIATE LEGAL RESPONSE
The vast majority of abused children who kill abusive parents are con-
victed of murder or manslaughter, with acquittals a rarity.' 98 After a con-
viction results, punishment is determined. The imposition of sentences will
affect a much greater number of child abuse-parricide defendants than will
the classification of the offense, as approximately ninety percent of parricide
cases are resolved through the plea bargaining process rather than through
criminal trials.1 99 In parricide cases, while sentences range from no punish-
ment at all to life in prison, the average sentence is approximately fifteen to
twenty years imprisonment. 200 Based on continued disparities in the crimes
for which the defendants are convicted and the severity of the sentences im-
posed, pertinent societal goals and the role of the criminal justice system, as
they relate to abused children who kill their abusers, must be identified
before there is appropriate treatment in parricide cases.
A. Prevailing Goals and Considerations
1. Societal Goals
It has been widely recognized that children have a right to be safe in their
own homes and to be free from physical, emotional, and sexual abuse.20'
Parents have a responsibility to care for and protect their children,202 while
society too must strive to protect them.20 3 If a parent abuses a child and
violence continues to occur, society's short-term goals are to protect the
198. MONES, supra note 5, at 315.
199. CAMPBELL, supra note 25, at vii (asserting that, as a result, "for the vast majority of
accused citizens and eventually for each judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel, sentencing
looms as the major concern"); see Margolick, supra note 187, at D20 (citing that "in 9 of 10
[parricide] cases, plea bargains are eventually struck"). These figures coincide with the figures
for the disposition of all criminal cases. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 10, § 1.4(d) (ap-
proximating that ninety percent of all criminal cases are resolved by pleas of guilty rather than
criminal trials). The plea bargaining process often results in an agreement between the defend-
ant and prosecutor, whereby a defendant may plead guilty to: a lesser offense than that origi-
nally charged; one or some of the charges, with other charges being dropped; or, the offense
charged and receive, in return, the recommendation of a lighter sentence. Id.
200. See MONES, supra note 5, at 315.
201. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 42-46,
53-58; see also Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 91 (stating that child abuse is a crime); Mitch-
ell, supra note 15, at 1730 (stating that all persons have a right to safety and protection);
Taylor, supra note 15, at 1725 (noting a person's right to physical safety).
202. John, supra note 1, § 13, at 413 n.60 (affirming that parents have a "primary responsi-
bility" in caring for their children).
203. Id. (acknowledging that society is obligated to aid parents in this endeavor and, when
parents fail, society must assume primary responsibility); see also Waits, supra note 104, at 304
(arguing that society is responsible for the protection of its citizens, in particular, those unable
to protect themselves).
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child and rehabilitate the abusive parent. 204 Among the long-term goals of
our society are the prevention of child abuse and the termination of the indi-
vidual cycle of violence, so that the child may overcome physical and emo-
tional difficulties, and not become a future victim of abuse or perpetrator of
violence against others.2°5
The goals of combatting abuse must also be considered when adolescents
who have not received societal protection take the lives of abusive parents.
While parricide clearly accomplishes the short-term goals of protecting the
child and deterring the abusive parent, it does nothing to address the long-
term goals of preventing child abuse and ending the child's cycle of vio-
lence.20 6 Moreover, because a parricidal killing implicates a second crime,
homicide, additional long-term societal goals of preserving human life and
limiting self-help must be recognized.20 7 The competing goals relating to
both child abuse and homicide must be balanced in fashioning an appropri-
ate legal response to parricide defendants.208
While society plays a critical role in encouraging and deterring behavior,
the criminal justice system is another mechanism that influences actions. 2 9
When abuse has not been prevented and children subsequently take the lives
of abusive parents, societal goals must be considered in the context of crimi-
nal justice jurisprudence in order to determine the appropriateness of a legal
response.
2. The Role of the Criminal Justice System
According to LaFave and Scott, criminal law exists to protect society em-
phasizing "the prevention of the undesirable" over "the encouragement of
the desirable., 210 In parricide cases, the "undesirable" includes both child
abuse and homicide.2 1 In assessing the most effective means of preventing
204. See Waits, supra note 104, at 271, 303-05 (discussing goals of combatting abuse); see
also id. at 304 (stating that "the law must strive to protect children").
205. See id. at 303; see also id. at 297-98 (mentioning effects of abuse on children and the
intergenerational nature of abuse); supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
206. By killing the abusive parent, the child protects himself from that parent, obviously
deterring the parent from inflicting further abuse. However, the killing does not specifically
end the child's cycle of violence, see supra text accompanying notes 59-66, 93-97, or further the
general long-term goal of preventing child abuse, see supra text accompanying notes 27-32,
205.
207. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text; see also Rosen, supra note 15, at 18
(observing that these are basic goals of criminal law); Creach, supra note 15, at 637 (noting
society's overriding interest in limiting self-help).
208. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
209. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 10, § 1.5.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text; see also Van Sambeek, supra note 16,
at 91 (noting that both child abuse and homicide are crimes). Discouraging these "un-
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these "undesirables," it is important to understand the role of both criminal
law and the criminal justice system in society.
Several generally accepted theories on this subject have been developed
including: individual deterrence,212 restraint,213 rehabilitation, 2t 4 general de-
desirables" is analogous to the societal goals of preventing child abuse and the taking of human
life. See supra text accompanying notes 206-08.
212. The theory of individual deterrence or prevention purports to modify the behavior of
the individual who has committed a crime "by giving him an unpleasant experience he will not
want to endure again" in order to ensure that the offender refrains from committing such
crimes in the future. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, § 1.5(a)(l). As discussed in the child
abuse-parricide profile, children who take the lives of their abusive parents have suffered un-
pleasant experiences for most of their lives. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82, 87-88.
It is to escape those "unpleasantries" that most children commit the acts against the abusers.
See, e.g., Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1018-25 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 89 and accompanying text. Moreover, most of these children pose no threat to
society at large. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78. As a result of the parents' deaths,
the threats no longer exist and the children normally feel safe and free, even if confined to
prison. See supra text accompanying note 93; supra note 95; see also MONES, supra note 5, at
246 (quoting a child abuse-parricide defendant comparing prison life with home life). In parri-
cide cases, therefore, sentencing a child or adolescent to prison would likely defeat the objec-
tive of the prevention theory. See, e.g., People v. Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 338 n.5
(App. Div. 1985) (noting that "the deterrent effect of a harsh sentence is questionable"), aff'd,
People v. Dawn Maria C., 490 N.E.2d 530 (N.Y. 1986); see also Van Sambeek, supra note 16,
at 105 (arguing that a parricide defendant is generally "not a recidivist and does not need
punishment to discourage him or her from committing another crime").
213. Restraint is aimed at incarcerating or isolating the offender in order to protect the
general public from dangerous persons with a history of criminal conduct. LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 10, § 1.5(a)(2). Moreover, "[t]he most reliable indicator of the likelihood of future
criminality is the number of prior contacts a youth has with police and the courts." Barry C.
Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 706 n.74 (1991) (cita-
tion omitted). While each parricide case must be decided on a case-by-case basis, the profile of
abused children who kill abusive parents generally indicates that the youths have no prior
criminal history and pose no threat to society at large. See supra text accompanying notes 75-
78. Rather, these children are usually "good" children and unique in that they respond not to
innocent persons, but to parents who have inflicted severe and continuous abuse. See supra
text accompanying notes 75-89. The available evidence suggests that blindly restraining, incar-
cerating, or isolating abused children who kill abusive parents typically will not further the
goal of protecting the general public. For example, see the case of Andrew Chi, discussed
infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text; Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 337-38 (explaining
that "the traditional purposes for sentencing would not be served by... an indeterminate term
of imprisonment") (citation omitted); see also Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 105 (arguing the
restraint theory is not served by convicting a parricide defendant to prison).
214. The object of rehabilitation is to ensure that the person committing the crime is re-
formed through proper treatment, and may be returned to society if and when he or she is no
longer a threat. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, § 1.5(a)(3).
The rehabilitation theory rests upon the belief that human behavior is the product of
antecedent causes, that these causes can be identified, and that on this basis therapeu-
tic measures can be employed to effect changes in the behavior of the person treated.
Id. The child abuse-parricide profile demonstrates that abuse may be identified as the antece-
dent cause which triggers the children's behavior. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 70,
80-82, 88-89. Studies also reveal that the individual cycles of violence may be overcome if
recognized and treated, as most of the youths are amenable to treatment. See supra notes 93-
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terrence,21 5 education,21 6 and retribution.2 7 From what is known of the
context in which parricides occur, the most pertinent theories are rehabilita-
97 and accompanying text. Further, it is when the children are not treated and the cycle of
violence is not permanently broken that the threat may be realized through future participa-
tion in a battering relationship, as victim or perpetrator. See supra text accompanying notes
59-66, 204-05. Rehabilitation, therefore, may be successful in providing positive and effective
experiences and results for both the children and society. See, e.g., Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d
at 337 (asserting that based on the evidence, rehabilitation for the defendant seems likely to be
successful); see also discussion of child-abuse parricide defendant Bobby Stanberry, infra text
accompanying note 233; Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 104 (noting that conviction does not
further the goal of rehabilitation for these children).
215. Under a deterrence theory, the punishment of the offender is meant to deter other
members of society from committing that particular crime by imposing the threat of like treat-
ment. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 10, § 1.5(a)(4). Most parricide cases encompass crimes
of child abuse and homicide, and based on the stated societal goals, it is important that both be
recognized and deterred. See supra text accompanying notes 201-08; cf. Van Sambeek, supra
note 16, at 105 (arguing that deterrence is not critical for parricide, as other abused children
will not begin committing murders if the child is not punished).
216. LaFave and Scott describe the theory of education as serving as a device "to educate
the public as to the proper distinctions between good conduct and bad," with punishment
especially important for "crimes which are not generally known, often misunderstood, or in-
consistent with current morality." LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 10, § 1.5(a)(5), at 25.
Again, based on societal goals, the desired message under a theory of education is twofold:
neither abuse nor the taking of a life is to be readily condoned. See supra notes 206-08 and
accompanying text. However, the taking of human life is generally known as "bad" while
child abuse is not so clearly defined or understood. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying
text; see also Van Sambeek, supra note 16, at 90 ("Child abuse is a very disturbing subject and
most people would rather not acknowledge it . . . [while] parricide is an especially shocking
crime."). Therefore, when a child kills an abuser and is convicted of first-degree murder with a
lengthy prison term, with no message being sent to those who abuse, then society, in effect,
continues to defend and allow child abuse. See MONES, supra note 5, at 313; see also supra
note 51.
217. The goal under the theory of retribution is to impose punishment in order to obtain
revenge, or to punish one person for inflicting harm on another. LAFAVE & SCOrT, supra note
10, § 1.5(a)(6). This theory is based on the proposition that a person should take responsibil-
ity only for that which he is culpable. See id. § 1.5 (a)(6), at 26 n.43. In addition, the United
States Supreme Court has stated that youth is "a time and condition of life when a person may
be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage," and such individuals "gener-
ally are less mature and responsible adults." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16
(1982). Parricide cases most often include adolescents who have been consistently and severely
abused by a parent, and failed by family, friends, or the social service and criminal justice
systems. See MONES, supra note 5, at 319 (delegating responsibility and stating that many
persons are responsible for the children's actions); see also supra text accompanying notes 80-
82. Based on the circumstances under which parricidal killings typically occur, responsibility
must be borne by all culpable parties. See, e.g., Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 337 (stating that
the defendant's act was "brought about through no fault of her own") (emphasis added); see
also supra text accompanying notes 96-97. Compare Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind.
1988), habeas corpus denied, Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 218 (1992) (convicting defendant of first-degree murder, merely acknowledging the
abuse inflicted by the parents and failed attempts to seek help) with discussion of Donna
Wisener, supra text accompanying notes 188-93 (granting complete acquittal based on the
defendant's history of abuse and its affects).
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tion, education, and retribution. 218 These criminal justice theories, coupled
with societal goals, dictate that courts must balance the desire to prevent
child abuse and end the individual cycle of violence against the desire to
preserve human life and discourage self-help when applying legal doctrine
and imposing sentences.219
B. Combining Data, Theory, and Goals
While the Jahnke decision balances competing goals in its classification of
the offense, the case is illustrative of a court stopping short in its balancing
considerations. After the jury found Richard guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter, the trial judge sentenced him to serve five to fifteen years in
prison.22 On appeal, although Richard argued that the court had abused its
discretion in imposing this sentence,22' the Wyoming Supreme Court af-
218. See supra text accompanying notes 72-97; supra notes 212-17.
219. See supra notes 198-218 and accompanying text; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 25,
§§ 2:1-2:5 (analyzing the theories of deterrence, restraint, rehabilitation, and retribution as
sentencing rationales).
220. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 994-95 (Wyo. 1984).
221. Id. at 1008. In an analogous case, a trial court recognized a history of abuse as an
extenuating factor by which to reduce a charge of murder but the resulting sentence included
only a prison term. In Cruickshank, the defendant, Dawn Cruickshank, shot and killed her
father, and was charged with second-degree murder. 484 N.Y.S.2d at 332. At her trial, Dawn
testified to a history of numerous violent acts and incidents of sexual abuse, and evidence
demonstrated that Dawn "feared her father would sexually abuse her on the night of the
shooting." Id. The jury ultimately found Dawn guilty of first-degree manslaughter, and the
judge sentenced her to two and one-third to seven years in prison. Id. On appeal, Dawn
argued that the trial court erred in failing to grant her youthful offender status. Id. at 336.
The court noted that the pertinent statute allowed for youthful offender status when "'the
interest of justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal
record and by not imposing an indeterminate term of imprisonment of more than four years.' "
Id. (citation omitted). The appellate court reversed the lower court, vacating the conviction
and adjudicating Dawn a youthful offender. Id. at 337. In its decision, the court suggested
that Dawn's act was not justified and that the offense was an "extremely serious, violent
crime." Id. at 336. However, the court considered several mitigating factors: Dawn had no
criminal record or history of violent behavior, she was known as a good and honest individual,
having respect for law and authority, she had cooperated with the police, and felt remorse for
her actions. Id. at 336-37. The court also recognized that Dawn was amenable to treatment.
Id. at 337. The court concluded that a prison sentence would be counterproductive, as well as
physically and emotionally dangerous. Id. at 338. The decision was reversed "as a matter of
discretion in the interest of justice," id. at 339, and was remitted for the trial court to deter-
mine "a reasonable definite term of incarceration along with a probationary period which in-
cludes the necessary counseling," id. at 338. On remand, the judge re-sentenced Dawn to five
years probation and ordered the continuance of counseling. See Carol DeMare, Sentence Re-
vealed to Public: Cruickshank on Probation, ALB. TIMES UNION, Feb. 11, 1988, at Bl. This
case provides an example of a court performing the proper balancing techniques, and moving
toward an appropriate legal response. See supra text accompanying notes 201-19; see also
infra text accompanying notes 224-43.
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firmed the lower court.2 2 2 While the lower court apparently understood and
recognized the history of abuse by viewing it as an extenuating circumstance
by which to reduce the charge of murder to voluntary manslaughter, the
court did not appropriately weigh all necessary factors in imposing the
sentence.223
Other courts have been more successful in moving toward an appropriate
legal response by taking enlightened approaches that more adequately and
effectively balance competing interests. In so doing, such courts have recog-
nized child abuse as an extenuating factor allowing for reduction of the of-
fense charged, but have gone further to impose creative, yet positive
sentences to respond to the parricide convictions. These cases exemplify the
manner in which the competing interests of the individual, society, and crim-
inal justice system may come together in order to produce a more appropri-
ate legal response.
In State v. Stanberry,2 24 the court considered extenuating circumstances
in order to reduce the crime for which the defendant was charged. 22 5 Seven-
teen year old Bobby Stanberry was charged with murder after he shot and
killed his father as he slept. 226 The judge stated that while the case seemed
to be a simple case of first-degree murder, the testimony indicated other-
wise.227 It was established at the non-jury trial that Bobby had been physi-
cally, emotionally, and sexually abused by his father, 22 ' had twice tried to
commit suicide, and had run away from home five times.22 9 After examin-
ing the entire context of the crime and focusing on the abuse,23 ° the trial
judge reduced the charge, convicting Bobby of voluntary manslaughter.2 3 1
The judge stated that "neither a murder conviction nor an acquittal will
222. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1009. There was also a separate concurring opinion by Justice
Brown. See id. at 1009-11 (Brown, J., concurring).
223. Instead, the court focused too heavily on retribution, and failed to respond to the
individual cycle of violence. See supra notes 205-06, 212-19 and accompanying text. Subse-
quently, in June, 1984, Richard's sentence was commuted to three years by Governor Ed
Herschler. The Governor's order was premised on Richard undergoing a 60-day psychiatric
treatment and evaluation. Youth Who Killed Abusive Father Has Term Cut, N.Y. TIMEs, June
16, 1984, at A6.
224. No. 90-1022 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 1991).
225. Id. at 2-3.
226. Paul Duggan, 'Black Letter of the Law'Softened to Gray by Judge, WASH. POST, Sept.
1, 1991, at Bl.
227. See Stanberry, No. 90-1022, slip op. at 1-2.
228. Id. at 3-4. Bobby had lived in constant fear of his father and had an anxiety disorder
and organic brain damage as a result of the beatings. Id. at 4.
229. Id. at 5. Bobby's mother, family, friends, the police, and social service workers were
all aware of the abuse, but Bobby was repeatedly returned home where further beatings oc-
curred. Id.
230. See generally id. at 1-6.
231. Id. at 6.
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satisfy the law, the facts, nor social purpose., 2 3 2 As a result, the judge im-
posed a suspended prison sentence of eight years, placed Bobby on proba-
tion, and ordered that he participate in a program for emotionally disturbed
children for two years in order to get him "back on track.
233
Also illustrative of the more appropriate handling of a parricide case is
that of eighteen year old Robert Lee Moody. Moody was charged with mur-
der for the shooting death of his father.2 34 After the court heard evidence of
the father's brutal abuse of his family, the charge was reduced and Robert
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.235 Upon conviction, the judge or-
dered psychiatric counseling, imposed a four year suspended prison term,
placed Robert on five years probation, and ordered him to spend a minimum
of two years working abroad.236
Another example of creative sentencing occurred in the case of Andrew
Chi. Andrew was charged with the stabbing death of his father, and pleaded
guilty to second-degree murder.2 37 After hearing all evidence, the judge de-
scribed Mr. Chi as a "psychological beast" who inflicted "terrible, terrible
psychological torture" on his wife and son.23s The judge made a determina-
tion that placing Andrew in jail would accomplish nothing.239 Instead, the
232. Id.
233. See Duggan, supra note 226, at B8. This case differs from many parricide cases in
that Bobby suffered brain damage and was in desperate need of psychiatric treatment. In other
cases, there is no apparent brain damage, and judges, therefore, take other approaches in deter-
mining punishment and/or therapy. See infra text accompanying notes 234-40.
234. See EWING, supra note 34, at 16.
235. See id. Evidence demonstrated Robert's father had abused his family for several
years; sexually abusing his daughter, forcing his wife to become a prostitute, and urging Rob-
ert to partake in pornographic activity and drug usage. Id. On the day of the murder, Robert
had witnessed his father repeatedly shove his mother's head into a kitchen appliance. See id.
Robert called the police, but when they arrived his mother would not press charges. Id. It
was later that day that Robert killed his father. See id. at 17.
236. Id. The fact that Robert was a born-again Christian influenced the judge's final deci-
sion to have Robert work as a Christian missionary. See id. at 16-17; see also Aric Press &
Daniel Pedersen, Sentence by Public Opinion?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 5, 1984, at 58, 58 (reporting
that the judge received approximately seven hundred letters of suggestion for sentencing, only
a few of which recommended a prison term). Here, it is important to note that the inclusion of
a religious aspect to the order of community service was solely at the request of the defendant,
thus avoiding any First Amendment concerns. Letter from Eric E. Younger, Judge, Los An-
geles County Superior Court, to Susan C. Smith, Note & Comment Editor, Catholic University
Law Review 3 (July 18, 1992) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
237. See Tom Vesey, Probation Ordered for Honors Student Who Killed Father, WASH.
POST, Feb. 17, 1983, at Bl.
238. See Meyer, supra note 83, at 16. This case is unique as it involved only emotional
abuse. However, its purpose in this context is to demonstrate how any singular type of abuse,
or combination of, may be considered detrimental. Furthermore, when balancing proper goals
in order to find appropriate solutions, creative and positive sentencing should be encouraged.
This case provides such an example.
239. See id.
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judge placed Andrew on probation and ordered him to perform eight hun-
dred hours of community service, teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic
to prisoners in a county jail.2"
The Stanberry, Moody, and Chi decisions are significant in that they rep-
resent a shift away from the traditional treatment of parricide cases toward a
more appropriate legal response. Like Jahnke, each court acknowledged the
brutality that drove the child to commit the crime and allowed for the reduc-
tion of the murder charge. More importantly, the trial courts each per-
formed a sensitive analysis and imposed a well-reasoned sentence that
provided a positive legal response to the child abuse-parricide defendant.
The verdicts in these cases more adequately and effectively address the com-
peting interests of the individual defendant and society, in a manner consis-
tent with the role of the criminal justice system.241
C. A Balanced Response
The parricide cases discussed throughout this Comment present very simi-
lar fact patterns that closely resemble the child abuse-parricide profile.242
Traditional analyses of such cases, resulting in convictions of first-degree
murder and severe sentences, demonstrate how society and the criminal jus-
tice system have not been equipped to deal adequately with many of these
children, their underlying problems, or the desired solutions. 243 As a result,
outcomes often remain undesirable, unjust, and ineffective. Conversely,
many battered children who kill abusive parents argue for sensitive analysis
of the context in which the crimes occur in order to support claims of self-
defense, a complete defense for their actions.2 ' By allowing testimony to
place battered children within the purview of the self-defense doctrine when
no imminent harm is present, the goals of the doctrine itself, society, and the
criminal justice system are ill-served. 245 Although the appropriateness of
the classification of the offense and the severity of the sentence will depend
on the facts of the individual case, evidence demonstrates that neither con-
victions of first-degree murder with lengthy prison terms nor acquittals by
240. See Vesey, supra note 237, at BI. Andrew had been an honor student at Cornell
University. The judge determined that Andrew and society as a whole would best be served by
ordering community service. See id.
241. See supra notes 205-08, 212-19, and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 144-93, 224-40 and accompanying text; supra note 221; see also supra
text accompanying notes 72-97.
243. See supra notes 136-60, 195 and accompanying text.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 109-18, 132-35, 178-93 (discussing claims by bat-
tered women and children defendants).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11; supra notes 119-22 and accompanying
[Vol. 42:141
Abused Children Who Kill Abusive Parents
self-defense are likely to succeed in meeting the interests of the individual,
society, or criminal justice system.246 Therefore, a balance is necessary.
Successful balancing techniques have been employed in classifying of-
fenses and determining sentences.247 When the crimes are viewed in their
entire context, most parricide cases contain extenuating circumstances suffi-
cient to justify the reduction of a charge of first-degree murder to voluntary
manslaughter.24 With voluntary manslaughter as the crime,249 both child
abuse and homicide are appropriately recognized and discouraged.250 More-
over, extenuating factors must also be considered in determining an appro-
priate sentence. In most parricide cases, ordering a suspended prison term
with a period of probation, combined with community service work and psy-
chiatric therapy, is a positive and well-reasoned response.21  This type of
sentencing addresses both crimes, requiring that the children take responsib-
lity for their own actions, yet allowing them to interact positively with soci-
ety and obtain necessary treatment.25 2 Approaching parricide cases in this
fashion permits courts to reach more appropriate responses in these most
difficult cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
When victims of child abuse take the lives of their abusers, society often
criticizes these victims for not stepping back, analyzing the situation, and
finding more appropriate solutions to deal with their problems. Before soci-
ety judges these victims, it too must step back and analyze the context in
which the crimes occur, and the goals to be achieved in order to provide
meaningful solutions. Historically, due to the non-recognition of in-
trafamilial violence and the dearth of information regarding child abuse and
parricide, society has been ill-equipped to deal effectively with such matters.
In light of successful efforts, largely on behalf of battered women, to isolate
and understand the roots and severity of the problems of abuse, society is
now in a much better position to aid in the prevention, intervention, and
correction of such tragedies.
246. See discussion supra notes 195-219 and accompanying text.
247. See case discussion supra note 221; discussion supra text accompanying notes 224-41.
248. See generally supra notes 67-88, 123-31 and accompanying text.
249. For ways in which this could be accomplished, see supra note 130.
250. See supra notes 130-31, 205-08, 211-19 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 221; supra notes 224-40 and accompanying text. See generally CAMP-
BELL, supra note 25, §§ 3:5, 5:1-5:6 (discussing the sentencing alternatives of community ser-
vice and probation); supra text accompanying notes 93-96 (emphasizing the need for providing
therapy).
252. See supra notes 93-97, 205-19 and accompanying text.
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When efforts to prevent, intervene, and correct these problems are unsuc-
cessful and abused children take the lives of abusive parents, the legal sys-
tem, at a minimum, must analyze the causal relationship between child
abuse and parricide. Blindly prosecuting and punishing these children,
when the crime would probably not have been committed had society re-
sponded to the abuse,2"3 ignores the societal and individual problems of
child abuse, elevating one set of societal goals over another. Moreover, ac-
quitting such individuals based on societal failures and the threat of contin-
ued abuse ignores the sanctity of human life.254 Both approaches result in
extreme solutions that are undesirable, unjust, and ineffective.
A balanced approach of weighing the desire to prevent child abuse and
end the individual cycle of violence against the desire to preserve human life
and discourage self-help is possible. Classifying parricidal killings as volun-
tary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder acknowledges the crimi-
nal nature of both child abuse and homicide, striking an appropriate balance
among identifiable societal goals that are consistent with criminal justice the-
ories. Upon a finding of guilt, whether by trial or plea, courts must then
utilize pertinent data to fashion appropriate sentences that will ultimately
benefit not only the individual child abuse-parricide defendants, but society
and the criminal justice system as well.
Susan C. Smith
253. See Buda & Butler, supra note 15, at 368 (noting the irony in a system that chooses a
non-interventionalist attitude to deal with problems of abuse, then prosecutes and severely
punishes an abuse victim subsequently resorting to self-help).
254. See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1984) (observing that "[a]lthough many
people, and the public media, seem to be prepared to espouse the notion that a victim of abuse
is entitled to kill the abuser that special justification defense is antethetical [sic] to the mores of
modem civilized society").
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